Investment-induced displacement in central India. A study in extractive capitalism by Damodaran, Vinita & Padel, Felix
 1 
Investment-Induced Displacement in Central India: a study in 




India’s abundant natural resources are a key feature of its new found status as ‘emerging market’ that 
attracts foreign investments. As India’s output of these metals and their ores increases, investments 
pour into India to secure deals over mineral deposits and manufacturing plants. Apart from direct 
funding for new projects, the new investments pay for a large increase in deployment of security 
forces, multi-layered ‘briberization’, and ‘protection money’ funding Maoist outfits, in yet another 
unending war which is fundamentally a resource war around mineral  and metal production – 
primarily steel and aluminum as well as coal and water. In this paper, we examine the mining 
operations in Central India where Vedanta Resources, a corporation that has become symbolic of 
neoliberal capitalism in India today, elicits huge new foreign investments to exploit India’s 
resources under the logic of emerging markets. If a quarter of postcolonial India’s Scheduled Tribe 
population was displaced by ‘development’ projects, this time it is foreign investments that are 
causing large scale displacement of indigenous populations.   
 
Investment and Dispossession for mining and minerals 
The displacement of populations to make space for large-scale development projects has a long 
history in postcolonial India. Of the total number of people displaced since India’s Independence 
by so-called ‘development projects’, approximately 20 million are tribal people, and about a 
quarter of India’s ST population have already lost land and homes through direct displacement 
(Fernandes 2008; Mathur ed. 2008 and 2011; Padel and Das, 2008 (2), 2010 and 2011; Padel 
2016). This process of displacement has been renewed, and even intensified after the economic 
reforms in India. As the nation, now in its branded commodity form, makes a shift towards open 
markets, the global demand for natural resources is fuelling displacement and conflict in several 
parts of India. In the post-reform context, the well-known term ‘development-induced 
displacement’ can easily be replaced with a new terminology of ‘investment-forced displacement’. 
In this paper, we look at the question of displacement in the fresh context of ‘emerging markets’ 
where India’s bid to attract financial investments invariably involves ‘opening up’ its territory to 
mining corporations eager to fulfill global demand for mineral and metal production. We turn our 
focus specifically on Central India that has witnessed conflict over resources over the past decades. 
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The arrival of foreign corporation keen on ‘investing’ in the region has intensified the scale of 
conflict. That the process of displacement was initiated in the colonial period and has intensified 
in the immediate post-Independence period is indisputable. Whatever the overall trend of asserting 
‘eminent domain’ and taking over tribal lands, British rule applied conspicuous breaks on the 
wholesale appropriation of tribal land through legislation such as the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act of 
1908, that attempted to codify tribal land rights, if only to temper the storm of tribal rebellions 
such as the Santal Hul and Birsa Munda’s rebellion in the nineteenth century. It is this body of 
legislation that is being watered down using the law of eminent domain which allows the state to 
acquire property to oust communities and people from their traditional lands for a public purpose 
such as irrigation or mining under the colonial Land Acquisition Act of 1894.(Damodaran 2009, 
2011). It is under this Act that communities have been displaced the majority of whom are Adivasis 
and Dalits have been displaced.   
 
Most of these of  displaced people have experienced an appalling drop in their quality of 
life and those  who are presently resisting displacement right now, are articulate on the fact that, 
for them, these projects are not development at all. What is indisputable is the fact that these 
projects are driven by financial investment. ‘Investment-induced (or forced) displacement’ is 
therefore the proper term for what is happening (Padel, Dandekar and Unni 2013). 
 
For many tribal communities , real development has been articulated as  ensuring food and 
water security, security in livelihood or jobs, and security of life. These securities are precisely 
what are being undermined by the large-scale ‘development projects’ believed to be intrinsic to 
‘national development’ – a belief promoted by politicians and those who fund them, including 
apex financial institutions such as the World Bank. India’s Prime Minister recently said that ‘tribal 
communities are a great force for national development’ (DNA 2015). Indeed they can be – but 
only if we start to listen to people like Lado Sikoka  and learn from the criticisms of contemporary 
development and  about how to live sustainably by basing our economy on ecological principles. 
(see Lado Sikoka’s  interview, p.5 this paper)  For over 100 years, ‘development’ as he notes in 
tribal areas has involved the worst forms of human sacrifice, based on the bloodshed and suffering 
of Adivasis.   
Displacement for mining, metal factories and dams has historically destroyed countless 
lives, and promises to those displaced have been systematically betrayed (Sahu 2009; Sharma 
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2010), reducing highly developed and skilled, self-sufficient farmers to ‘unskilled labour’ close to 
slave labour. Cultural genocide of India’s most sustainable and democratic communities is 
escalating, and little is being done to remedy this situation.  
Among the worst resource conflicts are those involving the takeover of Adivasi lands in 
Central India, especially in Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and 
Andhra Pradesh. Recent high profile cases include: new bauxite mines and alumina refineries by 
Vedanta and Utkal (i.e. Hindalco, a Birla subsidiary) in Odisha; Tata Steel’s new steel plant at 
Kalinganagar and new planned iron ore mines and steel plants in Chhattisgarh; new iron ore mines 
in Saranda Forest by Tata Steel and others (Dungdung 2015), and many new coal mines in 
Jharkhand; Essar and Hindalco takeovers of forest land for new coal mines in Singrauli, MP; 
planned bauxite mines, coal-fired power plants and the Polavaram dam in Andhra Pradesh. In West 
Bengal, the Nandigram and Singur movements stopped a Salim chemical plant and Tata car 
factory; while the Lalgarh conflict, that left hundreds of Adivasis dead or jailed, started up over a 
new Jindal steel plant. These are only a few of the new mega-projects presently staging takeovers 
of land and resources in every state.    
The role of planned investment for mining and metal production in Jharkhand alone is clear 
from reports by leading international investment agencies, in a context of massive increases in 
world-wide investments in mining (Padel and Das 2010, p.309). The impact is clear from the report 
Rich Lands, Poor People: Is Sustainable Mining Possible? (Centre for Science and Environment 
2008): India’s mining areas show the worst poverty indicators in the country, as evidence that the 
logic of the ‘Resource Curse’ plunges resource-rich countries into hellish conditions of 
impoverishment and conflict over resources, through intesnifying levels of exploitation. 
        In this paper, we show the ways in which financial investments in the mining sector are 
effecting the territories and the populations inhabiting those an aspect of ‘the corporatization of 
the Indian state’ pointed out by Kaur (2015). .. 
 
The Investment-driven Development Model 
The question of development or its most sustainable form, has always been at the heart of the 
debates on displacement and dispossession. Odia school books depict Odisha as one of India’s 
poorest states, ‘but rich in minerals,’ and in the minds of many politicians and policy-makers the 
minerals are lying ‘un-ulitilised’ on the mountains The notion of ‘un-utilized’ or ‘untapped’ readily 
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suggests the language of markets where resources left out of the commodification process are 
either seen as waste or potential surplus to be mined. And this becomes an obvious explanation for 
the lack of ‘development’ or poor living standards in the region. And either way, resources are 
discursively disconnected from the question of ecology and sustainability. Yet bauxite has a 
special property of combining with H2O, holding monsoon rain as it falls, on the summits of 
Odisha’s (and northern Andhra’s) bauxite-capped mountains, where these deposits form the source 
of hundreds of perennial streams, that in turn form the source of the region’s rivers. When a 
mountain’s bauxite deposit is mined, these perennial streams dry up, and the fertile area around 
the mountain become water-starved. This pattern is visible around India’s largest bauxite mine 
operated by Nalco on Panchpat Mali in Koraput district (Das and Das 2005, Padel and Das 2010). 
 The local resistance to such development projects has an equally long history. Speaking 
about Utkal Alumina’s development plans in Kashipur, Bhagaban Majhi, an Adivasi leader of the 
Kashipur movement opposing Utkal’s takeovers, speaks about the need for ‘permanent 
development’ that would benefit the villagers’ grandchildren, and their grandchildren, rather than 
a model that would devastate millions of years old mountains for the sake of short-term profits for 
a few distant officials, making war-planes and bombs from the aluminium (Das and Das 2005). 
Lado Sikoka is a leader of the Dongria Konds at the heart of the movement that has so far saved 
the Niyamgiri mountain range from Vedanta’s plans for mining bauxite from the summit of one 
of the biggest mountains. The company was formed in 2003 on the London stock exchange, out 
of Sterlite Industries, and investment orchestrated from London paid for construction of an alumina 
refinery at Lanjigarh, just below Niyamgiri. The local movement to prevent mining has received 
international support. A long-drawn-out legal process has reaffirmed a ban on mining bauxite from 
Niyamgiri, compelling the company to bring bauxite to feed its refinery from far away (Padel and 
Das 2010). As Lado puts it: 
‘Vedanta (mining corporation) has troubled us greatly. It is fighting with us for Niyamgiri. The 
company people try to lure us with schools, hospitals and roads in our villages. They cannot trick 
us like that. We will do whatever it takes to save our Niyamgiri. We have rights over the mountain. 
If they take Niyamgiri our world will be destroyed, won’t it? We won’t give up Niyamgiri for any 
price. What price are they offering us anyway? Niyamgiri isn’t crores and crores of money. 
Niyamgiri is our Life. We won’t flinch if you take our flesh. But we won’t tolerate Niyamgiri being 
dug up. This is our Dharma. They have bought Niyamgiri from the Government. But it doesn’t 
belong to the Government. It belongs to the Adivasis. Did Vedanta or the Government make this 
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mountain? How is it theirs to dispose of? … It makes me so angry… We may be outnumbered, but 
every one of us will fight to protect it… We are not afraid of asurmane (demons) like Vedanta… 
We have to be on our guard day and night. Can they give us five million rupees for every mango 
tree they destroy? Can they pay the proper price of every tree? They’re coming from abroad, and 
want to displace us to some barren land!? It seems like some demons have come to life here from 
ancient myths. There’s thousands of us, and we have our axes ready for them. Namaskar.’(Sikaka 
2010) [translation from Odia by Surya Shankar Dash] 
 
Lado spoke these words ) when he got up to speak at the Public Hearing at Belamba village in 
April 2009 where a wide selection of the local community spoke against expansion of the 
Lanjigarh refinery to a production rate of six million tonnes per annum. His words expressed a 
deeper truth, a lot more succinctly and eloquently than any piece of academic writing. 
The proposal was finally approved in January 2016 (Business Standard 2016), t 
 
Investment driven development projects are gaining ground even though it is becoming 
apparent that investment funds flowing into India are geared towards creating huge profits from 
extracting resources for a very small elite. The resources include minerals, water, forest and land, 
as well as cheap labour, and life-forms such as crops and animals. The ideology driving investment 
involves a technocratic model of ‘development’, in which raising the GDP includes raising 
productivity through top-down, large-scale forced industrialisation, as well as GMOs and bio-
engineering, and a huge increase in power generation, through coal, oil and gas, nuclear and 
hydropower (mega-dams); while the accelerating gap between rich and poor, devastated lives and 
livelihoods of those displaced, acute water shortages and pollution problems, and the resistance 
and painful divisions and conflict in society over rights to resources are glossed over as subsidiary 
problems in implementation. If the past conflicts were against the interventions of the 
developmental state, the new conflicts are staged in the same locations albeit against the 
corporations.   
 To take one example, the  dam project whose water and electricity has now been diverted 
to Vedanta’s Lanjigarh refinery in Odisha, has  long been the center of resistance against big dams.  
In the 1980-90s, the Upper Indravati reservoir project dammed five rivers in southwest Odisha 
funded by loans from the World Bank and turbines sponsored by Mitsubishi. Since the area is 
remote, the movement to try and stop the dam during 1989-1992 received very little national let 
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alone international publicity, even though this was just the time when the Narmada Bachao 
Andolan was active against the Sardar Sarovar dam. At least 40,000 people were displaced by this 
reservoir. Fifty per cent or more were Adivasis, and their situation continues to be appalling, with 
the majority far worse off than they were before, both among those who accepted resettlement in 
specially built colonies, and those who did not – many of whom were not considered eligible, for 
example when their villages remained while most of their land was submerged. Some were even 
marooned on islands (Padel and Das 2010: 95-100).  
Unusually, a World Bank consultant recorded what a man and a woman said to her on a 
visit to an affected village in 1993 that got published:  
 ‘If I starve you also bear a responsibility...’ 
‘We have nothing in our houses... You are a woman and we are women. You can see our situation 
and our children and you must understand. We can tell you things. Many things. You are a literate 
person from a big country. You understand these things that are happening to us. So please, as a 
woman, help us.’ (Caufield 1998 p.227; Padel and Das 2010 pp.96 & 455)         
But do literate people in powerful organisations really understand what is happening? If so, what 
have they done about the immense suffering and injustice perpetrated here and in hundreds of 
similar projects throughout India and other ‘developing countries’, by the World Bank itself, and 
dozens of associated institutions?  
In the documentary DAM-aged (Sahu 2009), people from one Upper-Indravati-affected 
village speak out. As they note , not one of the many promises they were made have been kept. No 
school, no health facilities, no safe drinking water, hardly any cultivable land. ‘If someone here 
gets ill, they wait here to die, unless they can raise the money from relatives or neighbours to travel 
the long way to town and visit a doctor and get medicine there.’ As for electricity – the project was 
built for hydropower as well as irrigation – on paper, displaced villages are supposed to have 
electricity; in reality, it never came, and since this scam has been done with all the proper paper 
work, politicians and bureaucrats alike wash their hands of trying to set it right. This documentary 
highlights the rarely heard voices of displaced people - ‘All our old people died within weeks of 
our forcible removal’ - ‘Before removal we lived like kings, we had so many kinds of food!’ -‘We 
so wish we could show our children how we used to live! Sometimes when the water recedes a bit, 
we see the top of our temple and can’t hold back our tears. How well we lived then! Water no 
problem. Food no problem. Medicines available in the forest....’  
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The degrading labour work that is the best most can do now, breaking stones for 
construction, is paid very badly indeed and barely keeps families alive. All around the edge of the 
30km long reservoir, the  forest has receded (on top of the extensive forest directly drowned)as  
illegally cutting a bundle of wood and carrying it to a distant town is one of the few other ways of 
staving off starvation. 
These kind of human details and voices from displaced people barely enter the resettlement 
literature. There is a ‘reality gap’ between policy and practice when it comes to resettlement and 
rehabilitation, and in the ‘development’ discourse in general, especially when it comes to foreign-
funded ‘aid’ by organisations such as the World Bank and Department For International 
Development (DFID) of the UK Government (Mosse 2005).  
One manifestation is in mainstream policy and media discourse on job-creation by 
‘development projects’. Another is ‘infrastructure development’ – creating infrastructure to entice 
companies to invest here. For example, Posco’s planned steel plant cum port in Jagatsingpur 
district of Odisha was promoted as India’s biggest FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) project, and 
was cleared under direct pressure from the Prime Minister’s Office by Jairam Ramesh in April-
May 2011 (Times of India 2011). It is projected as offering 48,000 direct and indirect jobs, with 
as many as 870,000 jobs estimated to come up during the next 30 years. Subjecting this to critical 
analysis, the Mining Zone People’s Solidarity Group (Iron and Steal – the POSCO-India Story, 
2010, by a group of US-based Indian scholars in contact with grassroots organisations) estimates 
that 7,000-17,000 jobs would be created in the construction phase alone, with a very small work-
force after this, while in the coastal area, the new steel plant and port would displace 20,000-40,000 
farmers, fisherman and others, who would lose their land and established livelihoods altogether – 
an arithmetic the project report is silent on. Although the ‘excellent package’ for those accepting 
resettlement offers one job per family, with free ‘training’, the reality is that highly skilled 
livelihoods under people’s own control are being destroyed, while similar projects show that such 
job guarantees lapse in practice after a few years, since there is no independent agency enforcing 
them. Moreover, a huge Adivasi population in 84 villages in Sundargarh district and 32 in 
Keonjhar would be severely affected  by the basic resource Posco’s project depends on – the iron 
ore, which is already being mined in the Kurmitar mine in Khandadhara mountain range (Mukerjee 
2012; Padel October 2012). 
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Among many other dams built in India primarily to supply water and hydro-power for 
metal factories, we can mention Mandira and Hirakud in north Odisha, supplying Rourkela steel 
plant and Alcan’s Hirakud aluminium smelter from the 1960s; Upper Kolab, for Nalco’s alumina 
refinery in Koraput district; Rihand, Mettur and Hasdeo Bango dams (UP-MP border, Tamil Nadu 
and MP), supplying refinery-smelter complexes for the aluminium industry for Hindalco, Malco 
and Balco; and Rengali dam in central Odisha that supplies several steel plants. Each of these 
reservoirs displaced tens of thousands of Adivasis and other subsistence farmers (Padel and Das 
2010). 
A number of new dams in peninsular India are being made right now with a view largely 
or partly to provide water and power for metal factories, including Lower Suktel (Balangir district 
of Odisha), Polavaram (Andhra-Telengana-Odisha-Chhattisgarh border – Umamaheshwari 2014), 
and Bodhghat (SW Chhattisgarh). Many new dams in Northeast India are being planned or already 
under construction with a view to selling hydro-power, fuelled by an ‘MoU virus’ of briberization, 
and against people’s movements and environmental regulations (Sharma 2003; Mitra 2006; 
Benjamin 2008; Dharmadhikary  2008; Indigenous Peoples Issues and Resources 2010; 
Chakravartty 2011; Rajshekar 2013).  
A similar situation applies to nuclear power stations that major movements are now 
resisting. At Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, new power plants have been commissioned through 
violent suppression of local opposition, including a much-publicized shift towards penalizing 
foreign-funded NGOs (Selvaraj 2012), and at Jaitapur on Maharashtra’s coast another people’s 
movement is trying to stop a new nuclear power station based on French investment. Quite apart 
from its devastating impacts on ecosystems and communities, the nuclear power industry does not 
make economic sense, and has a well-documented international history of lying and concealing 
vital information (Ramana 2012).  
Even worse is the Maoist civil war in Central India’s mining-affected areas. Part of the 
huge investments coming into these areas has funded a rapid increase in security forces, whose 
widespread atrocities include rape, committed with an impunity that guarantees repeat offending 
by men in uniform (Iqbal 2010; Padel 2008, 2011, 2013). Peace overtures by Maoist leaders Azad 
and Kishenji have ended with these men’s assassinations. From both sides, there is no end in sight, 
sacrifice people’s lives, for distant gains – a Maoist revolution in the distant future on one side, 
enormous profits from metal trading in distant places on the other. 
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Mining Corporations:  The Vedanta Model 
The story of how an Indian company named Sterlite Industries became a British company named 
Vedanta Resources, to orchestrate investment into India focused on the aluminium industry is well-
known..1 The early years of insider trading (indictements in 1998 and 1991) and tax avoidance 
culminated in bringing sums out of India through tax havens including Twinstar (registered in 
Mauritius), Volcan Investments (registered in Bahamas) and one called Angel Trading. 
Meanwhile, Sterlite had bought up Malco in Tamil Nadu in 1995, and a 51 per cent share in Balco 
in an exceedingly controversial deal in March 2001. Other investments followed, including a 64.9 
per cent holding in Hindustan Zinc Ltd in 2002, Sesa Goa iron ore mines, Cairn energy for oil 
wells in Rajasthan etc, and others.  
The investment orchestrated from London paid for constructing a new aluminium smelter 
at Korba, followed by the alumina refinery at Lanjigarh and a new smelter at Jharsaguda, co-
ordinated around attempts to get at Niyamgiri’s bauxite deposits from 2003 till today (2016). 
Expansion at Sesa Goa, and the closing down of Goa’s iron ore mines, controversies around the 
buying up of Cairn India, plans for steel plants and nuclear power in Odisha, and for rare earth 
sand mining on the beach near Puri where Vedanta planned the world’s largest private university, 
and especially a major investment that Vedanta made in Zambia by buying up the Kongola Copper 
Mines, have been covered in Foilvedanta’s website (e.g. Foilvedanta references 2013-14). 
To focus here on the Niyamgiri story is complex enough. Basically, within days of Vedanta 
Resource’s registration on the London Stock Exchange in December 2003, villages near the town 
of Lanjigarh in Kalahandi district of Odisha were being removed to make way for the fast-track 
construction of Vedanta’s refinery, in which an Australian and a Chinese company were involved. 
Villagers who protested were beaten up or jailed. As Dai Singh Majhi commented – a Kond 
villager who had refused displacement and compensation – ‘We’re being flooded out by money’ 
(Padel and Das 2010, p.148). 
Forest and Environmental Clearance for the refinery and for mining bauxite from Niyam 
Dongar just above had been applied for separately, and when the case came to the Supreme Court, 
the Central Empowered Committee sent a team whose report was clear that clearance should be 
refused, since bauxite mining would have strong negative impacts on the mountain’s and wider 
region’s ecology, especially on the streams that start from the bauxite deposit, as well as the 
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livelihood of many Dongria Konds. The Supreme Court judgement nevertheless appeared to go in 
Vedanta’s favour, after the judges commissioned favourable reports, and called for the setting up 
of a Special Purpose Vehicle in which the Orissa Mining Corporation (OMC) and Odisha 
Government were to be in Joint Venture with Vedanta, with the OMC doing the bauxite mining (a 
complex chain of events summarised in Padel and Das 2010, chapter 6).   
However, this judgement was conditional on the Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(MoEF), which had not yet given clearance for mining; and after sending a team to look carefully 
into the case, Jairam Ramesh, as Minister, refused this clearance (Venkatesan 2010). Rahul 
Gandhi, visiting Niyamgiri in August 2010, invited the Dongria leader we have quoted, Lado 
Sikaka, who had days before been arrested by plainclothes police, tortured and threatened with 
death, onto the manch beside him to speak, and congratulated the Dongria on saving Niyamgiri 
(NDTV 2010). The OMC – now directed by the same Saswat Mishra who had been Collector of 
Kalahandi orchestrating the removal of villages to make way for the refinery in 2004! - appealed 
this refusal at the Supreme Court. After several hearings, the Supreme Court, in a judgement in 
April 2013, ordered the affected villages in Niyamgiri to decide whether they wanted mining ‘and 
development’ or not. The Odisha Government selected twelve villages, and though many civil 
rights groups said that all Dongria villages should decide, as it affected them all, Gram Sabhas 
were organised in these selected twelve communities during June-August 2013. All twelve voted 
unanimously against mining (against Maoist diktats – The Hindu, 2013); and also refused being 
granted individual plots of forest under the Forest Rights Act, on the grounds that traditionally 
they had rights to the whole area, including the contested summit which is the abode of their deity 
Niyam Raja, under which the bauxite deposit lies (events summarised in Padel 2014, Choudhury 
2014, and Foilvedanta articles).  
Despite this victory, after Maoists kidnapped two Italian tourists in 2012, demanding an 
end to ‘tribal tours’ in Odisha, the Odisha Government obliged, temporarily banning them, as well 
as foreigners’ entry into Maoist-affected districts, with the result that Dongria villages have been 
entered and harshly harassed by ‘combing operations’ by the Central Reserve Police Force 
(CRPF), who have built camps around Niyamgiri, often behaving brutally towards Dongria, jailing 
several known activists, and often reportedly feasted by Vedanta (BBC 2012; Patra 7 and 13 June 
2013; Rajshekar 2015). 
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Vedanta’s recent attempts to get hold of Odisha bauxite focus on Niyamgiri, as well as 
neighbouring bauxite-capped mountains near Karlapat in Kalahandim, including Kandhual Mali; 
approached from Lanjigarh through prime forest, wthat still has elephants and other apex species, 
which connects these ranges with Niyamgiri - ranges where Kond villagers are equally determined 
to resist the mining of their mountains (Padel 2014; Mohanty 2015). 
The Vedanta model is symptomatic of a widespread pattern exemplified in the aluminium, steel, 
power and construction industries, where a rapid influx of financial investment is having 
catastrophic impacts on ecosystems and the communities that have lived largely in symbiosis with 
them over countless generations. In the words of Odisha Adivasis – ‘We’re being flooded out by 
money’, ‘We can’t eat money’ and others - contradict assumptions underlying the Human 
Development Index (HDI), that measure well-being by income. Implicitly, through such words, 
Adivasis also reject the ‘briberization’ values of mainstream money where ‘eating money’ (paise 
khanna) is the common Hindi expression for taking bribes 
      Through a few key projects in the deeply connected industries of aluminium, steel and coal, 
links between foreign investment and large-scale displacement are particularly clear,  (Kaur 2012 
p.605). Essar Power followed Vedanta’s example of registering on the London Stock Exchange 
with a view to eliciting investment for its highly controversial Mahan coal mine and power plant 
in Singrauli, Madhya Pradesh.     
Coal mines are expanding throughout central India, especially on Adivasi lands, and 
perhaps India’s real coal scam is not ‘Coalgate’ – the biased allocation of coal deposits, avoiding 
competitive bidding, during 2004-2009, that was revealed in a draft report from the Comptroller 
Auditor General in March 2012 – so much as the over-ruling of Jairam Ramesh’s ‘No Go Areas’, 
by which the Ministry of Environment and Forests had attempted to place a moratorium on just 
over one third of India’s coal deposits, lying under exceptional forest cover. The concept of these 
‘No Go Areas’ was dramatically rejected under pressure from the Coal and Energy Ministries, 
with support from the Prime Minister’s Office, during 2010-2011. One of the main faults 
highlighted by ‘Coalgate’ is that many coal deposits have been kept idle and non-producing. But 
who says they should be producing? – that these coal desposits should be mined as rapidly as 
possible? Not the communities who are protesting against new coal mines in Singrauli and 
Jharkhand for sure! The media-highlighted ‘Coalgate’ issue has thus masked the considerably 
more sinister implications of rejecting ‘No Go Areas’, confusing public perception of the 
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numerous anti-coal-mining movements emerging as companies race to start mining ‘greenfield’ 
deposits (Times of India 2010; Siddhanta and Sinha 2011). 
The financial pressures are all too clear. With a view to gathering momentum from 
international investment, Coal India – the world’s biggest coal-mining corporation – held an IPO 
(Initial Public Offering) sale in October 2010 that raised $3.43 billion, oversubscribing the shares 
on offer by fifteen times, with bids from leading US and other foreign banks and investment firms 
(Padel, Dandekar and Unni 2013: 109).    
But how long will India’s coal deposits last? India’s Coal Deposits Are Vastly Overstated: 
Is Anyone Listening? – a report by TERI (The Energy Resources Institute, formerly Tata Energy 
Research Institute, 2011) - makes clear that at present rates of extraction, India’s coal reserves can 
last just 45 years – and present rates are rising fast! Already, India is importing a large proportion 
of its coal – both thermal or ‘steam’ coal for power stations, of which Indonesia produces about 
25 per cent of the world’s supply, with India its biggest customer, at immense cost to Indonesia’s 
forests and forest communities; and also bituminous, coking or metallurgical coal, of which 
Australia exports 50 per cent of world supply (Mines and Communities 2010). Even in Australia, 
many communities are resisting new coal mines, at great sacrifice, especially Adani’s planned 
Carmichael mine, including crucial Aboriginal opposition (Movlan 2014; Tejas 2015; McKenna 
2015). 
Most of India’s coal deposits have a high ash, moisture and sulphur content, making them 
suitable for power plants, but not for steel plants. Only 15 per cent is bituminous or coking coal. 
This is concentrated in the Jharkhand-West Bengal area around the Jharia coalfields, notorious for 
unextinguished underground fires and vast degradation of the natural environment and formerly 
forest-based tribal communities that live there. Since this coal is suitable for steel plants, and 
India’s steel production is rising fast, pressure to mine these deposits is also rising fast, and we 
have witnessed movements by Adivasi communities resisting this pressure through democratic 
councils – pressure which manifests in the form of threats and potential violence. 
India’s area of highest concentration of coal mines and power stations is Singrauli in 
Madhya Pradesh.  
Singrauli, the energy capital of India, stinks. It stinks of human degradation and it stinks of the 
negligence of the Indian government and the World Bank which together have created an 
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environment described here as the lower circle of Dante’s Inferno ….. [where] 70,000 contract 
labourers now work in semi-slave conditions under corrupt labour contractors. (Rich 1994: 38-40) 
At least 20,000 people had already been displaced by 1994. Current investments for new coal 
mines and power plants were estimated in 2011 at 45,000 crore rupees, with a view to generating 
11,000MW of power. Over 3,000MW of this planned capacity is to come from an Ultra-Mega 
Power Plant called Sasan being built by Reliance, in mining partnership for developing three 
‘captive mines’ with North American Coal Corporation.  
Mahan Forest is an area in Singrauli where communities that have voted against new coal 
mines are being over-ridden, threatening another 14,000 people with displacement (Greenpeace 
and Kalpavriksh 2012), with a view to serving Hindalco’s aluminium factories at Renukoot (just 
across the border in UP), and Essar Energy, whose investments came by listing on the London 
Stock Exchange in April 2010. As local Adivasis say, 
‘Now the company people don’t allow us to enter the forest. They say the forest is now theirs. How 
can it be? If the government gives away these forests, we have no other means to live, and we will 
not even get any compensation....’ (Suchitra 2011) 
A Forest of an estimated 500,000 trees is to be cut for the project, affecting the livelihood of 54 
tribal villages, whose ‘consent’ they claim is fraudulent. With the High Court in Jabbalpur seeking 
an enquiry into this claim, a Collector about to hold a new Gram Sabha vote on the issue, in Amelia 
village, was transferred in August 2014. Essar and Hindalco say they have already invested 
Rs.20,000 crore in the project (Mandavia 2014). Hindalco is part of the Birla Group, which was 
the biggest single contributor to the BJP in the 2014 election (Dhawan 2014). Greenpeace activists 
have been targeted for undermining this coal-intensive investment by Essar and Hindalco (Naveen 
2014). Similarly in coastal Andhra Pradesh, many new coal-fired power stations are coming up on 
fertile land, with considerable police repression against protesting villagers (Masjumdar 2011; 
Sekhar 2011; Dharadhikary 2014). 
Investment that Fuels the Resource Curse Dispossession  
Foreign investment often appears as an obvious benefit, bound to promote ‘development’ by 
raising the GDP, while the ecocide of devastated biodiversity and water systems, devastated 
livelihoods of those displaced, and the intensely violent conflicts over resources presently gripping 
Eastern Central India are perceived as unrelated to the pattern of investment or rationalised as 
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acceptable costs. It is assumed that investment-led growth is reducing poverty, or is bound to 
reduce it.  
On the contrary, careful economic analysis of poverty trends shows precisely the opposite, 
and long-term benefits for the country as a whole from this extraction-oriented investment are 
highly questionable, since ecosystems are being devastated alongside communities (Alternative 
Survey Group 2007; Bhaduri 2009, 2010; Sharma 2009, 2011). The situation in India follows a 
trend in which poverty statistics are regularly manipulated to show a reduction in poverty, when 
actual trends are getting worse, and over 60 years of World Bank-led investment has produced a 
situation where India leads the world in malnutrition (Pred 2014; The Hindu 2015) 
The Congress-led Government in power from 2003-2013 took drastic measures to attract 
investment, from promotion of Vedanta among many other companies, to the SEZ Act (2005), and 
biggest-ever World Bank-orchestrated loans for road building starting in 2011 (Jaogota and 
Gangopadhyay 2011). The Government showed some ambivalence, as in Rahul Gandhi’s stand 
with the Dongria against Vedanta; passing a succession of Acts seen as ‘pro-people’, including the 
Forest Rights Act (FRA, 2005) and the Land Acquistion, Ressettlement and Rehabilitation Act 
(LARR, 2013). A succession of probes into illegal mining, including the Shah Commission, 
brought out damming reports in several states, including Odisha (Express News Service 2010), but 
was curtailed when it reached Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand (Counterview 2013; Chakravartty 2013; 
Economic Times 2014; Dungdung 2015); and care was taken to prevent investment into Odisha 
from diminishing for example (Times of India 2013; Mohan 2014).  
When Jairam Ramesh was Environment Minister, at least he questioned the pressures 
coming from business lobby groups, and noted the complete lack of dialogue between business 
and environmental or social activists (Ramesh 2010; Kumar and Bhushan 2012), though his 
clearance of many projects trashed environmental regulations (Bidwai 2011). His two successors 
in the Congress-led Government were more virulently pro-business in their rate of clearances 
(Pannu 2013; The Hindu 2014; Daniel & Verma 2014).  
Since the BJP-led Government came to power in mid-2014, the tendency to attract foreign 
investment at any cost has been even more marked, with a tendency that many have criticised to 
over-ride environmental and ‘people-friendly’ legislation, including the FRA, the LARR Act, 
labour rights and environmental safeguards (Aggarwal 2014; D’Monte 2014; Daily Pioneer 2014; 
Kumar and Chauhan 2014; Jigeesh 2014; Mahabal 2014; Narain 2014; Prajapati 2014; Sainath 
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2014; Sethi and Jha 2014; Tewari 2014). This escalation of pressure to clear projects to make way 
for investment is part of a world-wide trend (Narayan 2014).  
In India, starting with Manmohan Singh’s deportation of the German national who was 
questioning investment for the Kudankulam nuclear power station (Selvaraj 2012), there has been 
a tendency to crack down on activists on a wide range of environmental and social issues. An 
Intelligence Bureau report, commissioned by the Congress-led Government but released by the 
new BJP-led Government soon after it came to power in May 2014 portrayed Greenpeace among 
many other foreign-funded activists and NGOs as ‘anti-national’, without questioning the loot of 
India’s resources being orchestrated by foreign entities (Concerned Citizens 2014; Das 2014; 
Samantara 2014; E.A.S. Sharma 2014: Shiva 2014). Movements where village communities are 
opposing projects that will devastate their ecosystems and livelihoods are regularly portrayed as 
‘anti-development’ or ‘anti-national’, though from a different perspective they can be seen as 
safeguarding India’s resource base for  future generations (Dungdung 2013; Das and Padel 2013; 
Das and Rose 2015; Gill and Bhattacharyas 2015).  
In many ways, the investment pouring into central India is fuelling a classic resource curse, 
and a resource war (CSE 2008; Padel and Das 2010: 343-7). The corruption surrounding India’s – 
and the world’s - mining industry is not an occasional, but a deeply embedded structural feature 
(Padel and Das 2010: 202-6; Schneider, Bueh and Montenegro 2010). In India, it extends the black 
economy, first analysed around the urban property market (Kumar 1999) into land-grabs in India’s 
remotest regions that have profoundly negative impacts on ecosystems and communities, all 
fuelled by black money (Tiwari 2013; S. Sharma 2014). Worldwide, tax havens such as Vedanta 
have been used by leading financial institutions in ‘developed countries’ such as France, UK and 
the USA not only to avoid taxation but also to launder black money into ‘legitimate’ investments 
(Shaxson 2012). 
For all these reasons, the economics of investment-led growth need to be questioned from 
a holistic balancing of costs against benefits (Padel and Das 2010: 373-395; Padel, Dandekar and 
Unni 2013: 9-20). The destruction of ecosystems, especially through excessive water usage, by the 
steel and aluminium industries in particular, needs far better calculation (Ritthoff, Rohn and 
Liedtke 2002; Padel and Das 2010; Das and Rose 2015). Is the concept of economic growth a 
manifestation of the world’s ‘most dangerous fundamentalism’? Given the earth’s dwindling 
resource base, should we be aiming at planned de-growth to avoid a catastrophic melt-down, far 
 16 
worse than the 2008 crash? (Heinberg 2011; Padel, Dandekar and Unni 2013; Kothari 2014) 
Shouldn’t water, food and livelihood security be central to real development? (Padel 2012) Could 
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